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Many scholars observed that the “China threat” narrative greatly influenced the 
contours of Chinese foreign policy beginning in the mid-1990s. While scholars initially 
devoted significant attention to this change, there is little systematic analysis of the actual 
policy shift, particularly over the past decade. This thesis explores current manifestations 
of China’s “Goodwill Agenda,” examining three strains of Chinese foreign policy in the 
21st century: culture, institutions and aid. The paper also evaluates the success of this so-
called campaign, using global surveys to determine if the new orientation correlates with 
changed global opinions about China. Despite extensive efforts, my findings indicate that 
the Goodwill Agenda has not been successful at improving China’s reputation abroad. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the mid to late 1990s, a narrative emerged in Western academic and policy 
circles about the looming threat of China. China’s rise, especially in terms of economic 
growth, had been an ongoing phenomenon since the 1970s, but the “China threat” theory, 
which gained widespread attention especially among American policy wonks, did not 
emerge as a consensus until the post-Cold War period. This development did not go 
unnoticed in China; in fact, the coalescence of the China threat theory in Western 
quarters deeply disturbed members of China’s governing elite. 
Many scholars argue that this threat narrative greatly influenced the direction of 
Chinese foreign policy beginning in the mid-1990s, and they often refer to this 
orientation as China’s “new grand strategy” or “security diplomacy” for the twenty-first 
century (Deng 2006; Gill 2007; Glaser and Medeiros 2007; Goldstein 2005; Taylor 
1998). This strategy is specifically designed to promote a benign image of China and to 
show that it is a responsible stakeholder in the international system currently dominated 
by the United States. Indeed, as Yong Deng (2006) notes, “It has become a scholarly 
consensus that contemporary Chinese foreign policy has countered its negative reputation 
through a commitment to building a cooperative, responsible image in the international 
society” (186). 
This subject and the study of soft power, more generally, have also gained 
significant traction in Chinese scholarship. In response to the literature on soft power, 
Wang (2008) observes: “Few Western international relations phrases have penetrated as 
deeply or broadly into the Chinese vocabulary in recent years” (258). Indeed, soft power 
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has been embraced by the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
leadership. In a 2007 address to the 17
th
 Party Congress, President Hu Jintao officially 
recognized soft power as a key component to China’s national cohesion and strength. Wu 
Youfu, vice president of the Shanghai Public Relations Association and chancellor of 
Shanghai Foreign Language University, even suggested that “China should use the panda 
rather than the dragon as its national symbol” (Wang 2008, 258). 
Unfortunately, while scholars initially devoted significant attention to this general 
trend of change, there has been little systematic analysis of the actual policy shift, 
particularly over the past decade. Even more curiously, there has been almost no study of 
the broader effects of this changed policy for China’s international relations. Western 
scholarship, in particular, is preoccupied with international relations (IR) theory and 
whether, as a rising power, China exhibits the behavior of a revisionist or status quo 
power. Yet no one has asked the basic question: has China’s campaign actually been 
successful at improving the country’s image abroad? 
This research seeks to provide a more complete understanding of this question by 
evaluating the effectiveness of China’s new foreign policy orientation, which I refer to as 
“China’s Goodwill Agenda” in international relations.1 The Goodwill Agenda can be 
seen as a soft power campaign that combines cultural, rhetorical, institutional and aid-
related strategies in order to boost the country’s image and influence across the globe. 
The thesis examines three disparate strains of Chinese foreign policy, including cultural, 
institutional and aid-related strategies. My research then evaluates the effectiveness of 
these efforts by analyzing public opinion polls gathered by the Pew Global Attitudes 
                                                 
1
 I borrow the term “Goodwill Agenda” from Paradise (2009). 
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Project from 2002 to 2012. Has China’s Goodwill Agenda in foreign policy correlated 
with changed global opinions about China? Which of these strategies proves most 
successful? When and why have attitudes towards China improved, and when and why 
have they stagnated or soured?  
The thesis begins by reviewing perceptions of Chinese foreign policy prior to the 
1990s. It then offers a brief discussion of the origins of the China threat theory and the 
resulting Chinese grand strategy that coalesced during the 1990s. I argue that China’s 
Goodwill Agenda mirrors the strategies of other great powers throughout history, and it is 
unsurprising that China developed a new orientation for its foreign policy for the twenty-
first century. The thesis then moves into deeper discussion of the Goodwill Agenda and 
finally advances into my primary research question: has the Goodwill Agenda been 
successful at improving China’s image abroad? 
 In my analysis, I use four indicators in a time-series analysis to evaluate the 
success of China’s Goodwill Agenda across multiple dimensions from 2002 to 2012. To 
measure the effectiveness of China’s cultural strategies, I examine the Confucius Institute 
project, a language and cultural promotion program which began in 2004 under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Education (Chinese Language Council). To measure the 
appeal of China’s foreign policy – frequently cited as a critical component of soft power 
(Nye 2004; Voeten 2012) – I incorporate voting behavior at the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) using an S-score, which represents the level of similarity in voting 
behavior between countries (Strezhnev and Voeten). The S-score is an increasingly 
common and useful proxy for measuring state preferences (Dreher and Jensen 2011; 
Voeten 2012). Finally, I measure the level of China’s foreign aid by analyzing two 
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indicators: the number of completed aid projects from 2000 – 2005, documented by the 
China Commerce Yearbook and summarized in Hawkins et al. (2010) and the cumulative 
amount of food aid distributed by China between 2000 and 2010 recorded by the World 
Food Programme (2012). Together these indicators represent key components of China’s 
Goodwill Agenda across cultural, institutional, and aid dimensions. Therefore, the 
Confucius Institute project, China’s voting behavior at the UNGA, and China’s aid to 
other countries set the stage for a useful analysis of China’s Goodwill Agenda in the 
twenty-first century. 
My analysis reveals that, overall, favorable opinions toward China have actually 
decreased between 2002 and 2012 and that the Goodwill Agenda’s has produced little 
success at improving China’s image abroad (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2012). This 
does not mean that China’s Goodwill Agenda has been completely unsuccessful. In fact, 
there are some elements to this foreign policy orientation (such as the Confucius Institute 
project and foreign aid program) that probably have helped improve the country’s image 
abroad. Specifically, China’s food aid program has succeeded in building goodwill 
among a few developing countries. In addition, without the Goodwill Agenda, it is very 
likely that China’s reputation would have suffered even more over the past decade, in 
light of China’s continued rise in the global system. Unfortunately for the Chinese, the 
effects of the Goodwill Agenda are not enough to offset an overall deteriorating trend.  
The findings raise concern about China’s overall global image and the extent to 
which soft power foreign policy strategies can alleviate negative and threat-oriented 
opinions about China. Scholars who argue that Beijing’s domestic policies undermine 
China’s soft power resources may have a point. The thesis finds that liberal countries are 
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much more likely to hold lower opinions of China than their illiberal counterparts. The 
cultural, institutional and aid-related strategies of China’s Goodwill Agenda have not 
been able to mitigate these effects, and China may need to reform its own domestic 
policies if it truly wishes to effect change in its international reputation. 
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CHAPTER II 
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 
To lay the foundation for my analysis, the thesis builds from two broad strains of 
literature: the China threat narrative, which appeared popularly and academically in the 
early 1990s, and the literature on Chinese grand strategy, which gained particular 
attention among Western scholars during the mid-1990s. In what follows, I briefly review 
each of these literatures, although I first provide an account of China’s relationship with 
the West since the 1970s normalization of relations.  
 
China and the West 
China’s renewed partnership with the rest of the world began with the 
normalization of relations between China and the United States during the 1970s, which 
cemented a partnership with the West grounded in Cold War politics and buttressed by 
economics. In what David Lampton (2001) calls a “grand bargain,” Beijing and 
Washington came to an understanding on a wide variety of policy issues in order to 
stabilize Sino-American relations in light of a common adversary, the Soviet Union. 
After President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, China and the United States formalized 
these understandings in the Shanghai Communiqué, which reiterated the two countries’ 
commitment to peace in Asia by increasing contact and communication, promoting 
mutual respect and understanding, and discussing a broad range of policy issues. In the 
ensuing decades, China pursued a kind of “commercial diplomacy” that highlighted 
economic development and mutual benefit under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping who 
wanted to maintain a low profile in international relations (Ding 2012).  
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Though sharp disagreements and points of contention existed – chief among them 
the issue of Taiwan – China and the West managed to push these concerns to the 
background and concentrated, instead, on their shared common interests. No other issues, 
including Chinese arms sales to the Middle East, human rights abuses, political 
repression, espionage activities, and protectionist trade practices, seriously threatened 
China’s strategic partnership with the West during this period (Cohen 2010). Taylor 
(1998) elaborates: “Perceived as undergoing a much-applauded modernization 
programme with social as well as economic ramifications, Beijing was throughout the 
1980s given favourable treatment by the Western media who saw/hoped that China was 
being remade as a Chinese imitation of the West's self-image” (446). This tenuous and 
sometimes uneasy, yet amicable relationship persisted throughout the 1980s, but the 
Tiananmen Square crackdowns in June 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union upset 
this delicate coexistence.  
The crackdowns in Tiananmen Square brought the kind of attention that Deng 
Xiaoping had long sought to avoid. “The June crackdown was … seen as not only a 
violent reaction to domestic unrest,” Taylor argues, “but also a conscious rejection by the 
Beijing elite of the West's own aspirations vis-à-vis China and its ultimate destination” 
(446). In the United States, public opinion polls charting China’s favorability ratings 
plunged from 72 to 33 percent between February and August 1989 (Lampton 2001). 
Though opinions in Europe tend to reflect more positively, China’s image throughout the 
West bounced back in subsequent years but has never fully recovered from pre-
Tiananmen polling heights (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2011).  
8 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War only exacerbated 
these tensions. Without a common and clearly identifiable adversary, long-suppressed 
points of conflict suddenly rose to the fore. While worldwide reactions to the Tiananmen 
Square crackdowns do not fully explain the origins of the China threat theory in the West, 
the events in June “served as a catalyst for change in Chinese and American policies 
toward each other,” Lampton writes (2). Indeed, Deng shows that most Chinese accounts 
of the origins of the China threat theory date to the early 1990s and focus on 
policymakers in the United States, Japan and Taiwan – the three primary propagators of 
the China threat theory. For example, in 1992, he explains, the United States debated 
whether to send F-16s to Taiwan, and Japan considered a bill that would allow its Self-
Defense forces to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Deft political maneuvering 
by proponents in both countries highlighted China’s military threat to support their cause.  
 
Origins of a Theory 
Thus, a confluence of factors occurring at roughly the same time contributed to 
the development of the China threat theory. The events of 1989 had fundamentally 
altered the West’s perception of China, but the end of the Cold War had also changed the 
rules of the game. China’s rise suddenly began to look more sinister, and by the mid-
1990s, there is a well-documented movement within scholarly, journalistic and policy 
circles about the idea of a “China threat.” For Western scholars, Huntington’s famous 
thesis (1993) on the “clash of civilizations” ushered in a proliferation of literature on 
China’s threat to the West, which ranged from how China’s overpopulation and food 
shortages would result in a global food crisis to how China’s steady rise in the political 
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landscape would soon displace the United States as the world’s only superpower (Brown 
1995; Friedberg 2011). 
Bernstein and Munro (1997) capture a popular sentiment that unites these and 
numerous other works in The Coming Conflict with China. “[E]ven without actual war,” 
they write, “the rivalry between China and the United States will be the major global 
rivalry of the twenty-first century, the rivalry that will force other countries to take sides 
and that will involve all of the major items of competition: military strength, economic 
well-being, influence among other nations and over the values and practices that are 
accepted as international norms” (4). Perhaps it is not surprising then, that Mearsheimer 
(2001) and other IR scholars returned so enthusiastically to the study of great power 
politics at the onset of the twenty-first century. 
 
A New Grand Strategy? 
Many scholars (Deng and Wang 2004; Gill 2007; Goldstein 2005; Shambaugh 
2006; Sutter 2008) have argued that during the 1990s China developed a new grand 
strategy for its global relations. (Though, there is some contention about whether a 
Chinese “grand strategy” can be said to exist at all. At the very least, these authors argue 
that there has been a marked shift in the orientation of Chinese foreign policy that dates 
to the mid-1990s.) Indeed, in what he calls a neo-Bismarckian strategy, Goldstein (2005) 
explains: “China’s capabilities were increasing and its military was improving, both 
compared with its own recent past and relative to others. Yet its modest increase in power 
hardly seemed to justify the alarmed reaction it elicited, and it was this reaction that 
would shape China’s emerging grand strategy” (69).  
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The contours of this overarching strategy remain somewhat vague, but most 
scholars point to China’s active role in regional and international organizations; 
commitment to multilateralism; proliferation of partnerships and alliances around the 
globe; and leadership role in several pressing issue areas, including arms control, nuclear 
nonproliferation, and the six-party talks (Gill 2007; Goldstein 2005; Johnston and Ross 
2006). Collectively, these examples represent a marked shift in Chinese foreign policy, 
which had focused almost exclusively on economic relations. As Gill (2007) notes, this 
attitude is significantly “more confident, proactive, and convergent with international 
norms and, generally speaking, with U.S. interests” than previous Chinese policy had 
been in the years prior to the mid-1990s (203).  
Most importantly, scholars (see, for example, Deng and Wang 2004) argue that 
this new orientation – with its emphasis on diplomacy and activist international agenda – 
flows directly from perceptions of a “China threat.” As the China threat theory gained 
traction in other countries, and particularly in the United States, Chinese leaders began to 
worry about the dangers of a negative international reputation. To counter this image, 
Chinese leaders needed to develop a strategy that could work within the unipolar system 
dominated by the United States. In other words, “China’s grand strategy, [needed] to 
increase the country’s international clout without triggering a counterbalancing reaction” 
(Goldstein 2005, 12). Indeed, Deng (2006) shows that Chinese rhetoric and foreign 
policymaking since 1995 has been designed specifically to reduce the perception of 
threat.  
That Chinese foreign policy changed course during the 1990s should not be 
surprising for scholars of great power politics. China’s behavior in international relations 
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reflects that of other rising powers throughout history, including the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France and the United States. During the post-World War II era, for example, 
the U.S. launched a goodwill agenda of its own. The Fulbright Program, Marshall Plan, 
Peace Corps, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were all 
established between 1946 and 1961, just as the United States was cementing its position 
as global superpower. Couched in terms of moral obligation and benevolence, these 
programs were designed to engender goodwill across the globe and help the United States 
achieve its foreign policy objectives; and as part of their mission, the Fulbright Program 
and the Peace Corps were specifically designed to promote mutual understanding 
between the United States and the people of other countries (Peace Corps; U.S. 
Department of State). China’s Goodwill Agenda can be viewed through a similar lens. 
The country’s steady rise in the international system coupled with the China threat theory 
necessitated a response in foreign policy. The Goodwill Agenda represents the softer side 
of China’s international relations, the side that mitigates the effects of global anxieties 
related to displays of hard power and the country’s ongoing growth.  
Just as Bismarck artfully navigated the uncertain waters of European politics in 
the late nineteenth century, Chinese leaders in the twenty-first actively seek to allay 
international (and particularly American) fear and anxiety regarding China’s steady rise 
in the global system. The strategy, as Goldstein explains, is two-fold. First, it is designed 
to build partnerships around the globe, particularly with other major powers, in order to 
make China an indispensable part of the international system. Second, it works to 
perpetuate the image of China as a responsible stakeholder in the current global order, 
and by extension, a status quo power. Like other great powers throughout history, Wang 
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(2008) writes, “Chinese public diplomacy has tried to transform China’s rise from a hard 
rise to a soft rise” (258). 
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CHAPTER III 
CHINA’S GOODWILL AGENDA 
From this context, China’s Goodwill Agenda can be seen as a soft power 
campaign designed to boost the country’s overall global influence and counteract 
negative and threat-oriented images about China. Joseph Nye Jr. coined the term ‘soft 
power’ in 1990, which he defines as “the ability to get what you want through attraction 
rather than coercion or payments” (Nye 2004, x). Distinct from more traditional 
understandings of military and economic power, soft power provides a country an 
additional base of power, one with the ability to get “others to want the outcomes that 
you want” without exerting significant resources or strong-arm tactics to achieve your 
goals (5).  
Nye argues that a country’s soft power can come from three places: its culture, its 
political values, and its foreign policies (11). He writes, “The countries that are likely to 
be more attractive and gain soft power in the information age are those with multiple 
channels of communication that help to frame issues; whose dominant culture and ideas 
are closer to prevailing global norms (which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism, and 
autonomy); and whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international values 
and policies” (32). This conception of soft power favors Western values, and thus it is not 
surprising that Nye (2012) and others have cast doubt on China’s ability to harness its 
soft power resources, especially in light of many of China’s domestic and foreign policies 
that have garnered international condemnation such as China’s treatment of human rights 
activists, censorship of the media, and relationship with authoritarian regimes like Sudan 
and Zimbabwe. But any country, including the United States, carries a mixed record 
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when it comes to policy. Even more fundamentally, values and practice do not always 
align. There is no doubt that many of China’s policies and values present challenges to 
building a positive China brand, but there is also no reason to disregard China’s soft 
power resources without a deeper evaluation of Chinese efforts in this arena.  
Thus, if we think of soft power as attractive power, China’s Goodwill Agenda is 
clearly designed to make China more appealing to international audiences. It works to 
promote a benign, positive, and peaceful image of China around the globe through 
cultural, institutional, and aid-related strategies. In areas where the Chinese have 
deployed language institutes and foreign aid and when Chinese foreign policy 
preferences become attractive to foreigners, we would expect global opinions of China to 
improve. The Goodwill Agenda is designed to build a secure material environment, one 
where China can more easily achieve its foreign policy objectives. “Soft power has to 
make China’s rise palatable to the world and has to create understanding, regard and 
ultimately support for China’s political model and policies,” writes d’Hooghe (2011). “It 
has to help China win friends and allies, and to advance the country’s agenda. It is 
therefore no surprise that building and projecting soft power have been put firmly on 
China’s international agenda…” (1).  
Admittedly, “Goodwill Agenda” is a somewhat ambiguous designation, and this 
campaign guides Chinese foreign policy along multiple fronts. It includes, for example: 
the spread of Confucius Institutes, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) to Asia, the 
international expansion of CCTV, the proliferation of foreign policy white papers, 
rhetorical references to “peaceful rise,” and the development of organizations such as the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). All of these efforts are designed to increase 
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China’s influence and deter negative images of a threatening China. Although they do not 
always fit perfectly with Nye’s conception of soft power, these strategies are united by 
Chinese intentions to engender goodwill among global audiences. On the other hand, 
policies likely to upset international audiences such as China’s military modernization, 
power projection, and even vetoes on the UN Security Council do not fall within the 
bounds of this agenda. In fact, these are precisely the policies that the Goodwill Agenda 
is designed to offset.  
The thesis examines three manifestations of the Goodwill Agenda across three 
dimensions of Chinese foreign policy: the Confucius Institute project, China’s voting 
behavior in the UN General Assembly, and foreign aid. While the Confucius Institute 
project represents a straightforward example of a cultural soft power strategy in the 
Goodwill Agenda, China’s voting behavior in the UNGA fits less perfectly under the 
Goodwill Agenda, and foreign aid remains a questionable source of soft power. I include 
these proxies for several reasons. First, in order to gain a comprehensive picture of the 
Goodwill Agenda, it is necessary to look beyond the cultural domain. Institutions, in 
particular, are frequently cited as evidence of a recent policy shift, and I include UNGA 
voting patterns in order to better understand China’s behavior within these international 
organizations (IOs). It is unlikely that China plans its votes according to how its 
preferences are received in other countries, but in terms of examining the internal 
dynamics of IOs, an analysis of UNGA voting is simply the best available proxy.  
Second, even though aid straddles the line between hard and soft power, it is 
probably more akin to soft power and thus deserves attention in my examination of the 
Goodwill Agenda. Aid is difficult to classify, especially in the case of China, where lines 
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between economic policy and foreign assistance are often unclear. However, there are 
clear examples of soft power forms of aid such as medical volunteers, food aid, and un-
tied project aid. In my analysis, I use two aid indicators to measure the Goodwill Agenda 
because Chinese aid data is so scarce. Food aid represents a clearer example of soft 
power than aid projects (which are often infrastructure-related) but together they form a 
more comprehensive understanding of China’s overall aid program, which is designed to 
build goodwill among developing countries.  
Nye (2004) explains the difficulty with identifying and wielding soft power, 
which “often has a diffuse effect, creating general influence rather than producing an 
easily observable specific action” (16). Though he cautions against reading too much into 
public opinion polls, he explains that “polls are a good first approximation of both how 
attractive a country appears and the costs that are incurred by unpopular policies, 
particularly when they show consistency across polls and over time” (18). Following 
Nye’s advice, the thesis then examines public opinion polls of 51 countries between 2002 
and 2012 conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the Goodwill Agenda. If successful, these strategies should improve 
global opinions about China in areas where the Chinese have deployed one or more types 
of these soft power resources. In what follows, I provide a deeper analysis of the cultural, 
institutional and aid strategies of the Goodwill Agenda and show that the effectiveness of 
these strategies is mixed, at best. 
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Culture and the Confucius Institute Project 
Chinese culture provides the basis for one of the country’s richest assets and has 
appealed to foreigners throughout history. Nye (2004) argues that culture plays an 
important role in a country’s soft power, and it is thus unsurprising that cultural strategies 
feature prominently in China’s Goodwill Agenda. Culture carries the power of attraction, 
and in his prolific writing on American soft power, Nye consistently points to 
Hollywood, educational exchanges, popular sports, CNN, and other cultural strengths that 
help the United States achieve its foreign policy objectives and represent an enduring 
feature of American soft power. If harnessed effectively, culture has the ability to 
engender tremendous goodwill. Many countries, including the United States and China, 
sponsor language institutes, student exchanges, or cultural programs to enhance their 
national identity. The Confucius Institute project is an outgrowth of Chinese efforts in 
this arena. Designed to spread interest in Chinese culture, promote foreign business 
activity within China, and increase the number of people studying Mandarin, Confucius 
Institutes and Classrooms are an attempt to highlight the positive elements of China’s 
image. 
The Confucius Institute project is not the only cultural strategy of China’s 
Goodwill Agenda. China has successfully employed high-profile events such as the 2008 
Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo to showcase Chinese modernity, 
history and culture. Other cultural promotion efforts include international exhibits for 
Chinese art, Chinese television programs broadcasted abroad, and the international 
expansion of China’s media giants, including Xinhua News and China Central Television 
(CCTV). Of course, the government is not always involved in these efforts, and events 
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such as musical concerts remain largely apolitical (Paradise 2009). But there are cultural 
elements to the Goodwill Agenda that Beijing influences directly. For instance, CCTV 
International, which launched in 2000, now airs in six languages: Arabic, Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish (CCTV News). This international expansion is part 
of a larger government effort to improve China’s international reputation through its 
state-run media organizations, including CCTV, Xinhua News, People’s Daily, and the 
Shanghai Media Group (Barboza 2009). Beijing makes no secret of its frustration with 
Western media outlets, and CCTV’s growing international reach allows it to present 
“greater diversity and wider perspectives in the global information flow” (CCTV News). 
However, the Confucius Institute project represents China’s most important 
strategy along the cultural front, and the Chinese government helps fund and facilitate the 
program. Modeled after European language institutes such as the Alliance Française and 
especially the German Goethe Institute, the Confucius Institute project similarly strives to 
promote language and culture for diplomatic purposes (Paradise 2009). The program 
began in 2004 under the guidance of the Office of Chinese Language Council 
International, known as Hanban, a nonprofit organization with ties to the Ministry of 
Education (Chinese Language Council). Confucius Institutes are typically pairings of two 
universities, one Chinese, one foreign with a three-fold purpose: to teach Chinese 
language abroad, promote cultural exchange between the two countries, and foster 
foreign business activity within China (Paradise 2009). Confucius Classrooms are 
another outgrowth of this project; they are usually pairings of secondary schools at the 
city level. By the end of 2010, there were 322 Confucius Institutes and 369 Confucius 
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Classrooms in 96 countries, representing every continent except Antarctica, and the 
program continues to expand (Chinese Language Council).  
Because it is a new and rapidly expanding program, the Confucius Institute 
project remains “very much a work in progress” (Paradise 2009, 653). Despite 
considerable funding from Beijing, the program has expanded at such a rapid rate that 
resources are sometimes scarce. Moreover, each institute is unique. Some of the institutes 
specialize in a particular area such as business or even Chinese opera (as is the case for 
the Confucius Institute at Binghamton University in the United States), while some have 
yet to establish a clear identity or focus. In short, there is wide variation among the 
hundreds of institutes across the globe (Paradise 2009).  
The project also seems to be aimed at certain geographical regions. Of the 322 
Confucius Institutes in operation, over half of them (57 percent) are in Canada, the 
United States and Europe (Confucius Institute Online). With 72 institutes, the United 
States has more Confucius Institutes than any other country – by a significant margin. 
The countries with the next largest numbers of Confucius Institutes are Russia (17), 
South Korea (17) and France (14). Africa has only 21 Confucius Institutes across its 
continent, and developing countries, in general, are underrepresented. It is not clear 
whether this is a strategic decision or whether this is simply an outgrowth of the bias 
towards regions with well-developed university systems. Every continent is at least 
represented, and it should not change our general expectations. We would expect 
countries with Confucius Institutes, and especially countries with multiple institutes, to 
possess more favorable opinions of China over time. Because it highlights only positive 
elements of the China brand and generates interest in the country, the overall project can 
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be considered a “type of impression management” that fosters the image of “a kinder, 
gentler China” (Paradise 662). In this way, the Confucius Institute project represents a 
strong example of a cultural strategy in China’s international Goodwill Agenda.  
 
Institutions and the Affinity of Nations 
Institutions provide another avenue to promote China’s Goodwill Agenda in 
international relations. In addition to culture, Nye (2004) explains that a country’s foreign 
policy preferences and political values provide major sources of soft power. He writes: 
“The values a government champions in its behavior at home (for example, democracy), 
in international institutions (working with others), and in foreign policy (promoting peace 
and human rights) strongly affects the preferences of others. Governments can attract or 
repel others by the influence of their example” (14).  
China’s approach to institutions plays an important role for the Goodwill Agenda 
in the twenty-first century, and China has steadily added to IO membership lists around 
the globe. If China actively participates, cooperates, takes on leadership roles and 
advocates popular policies within these settings, institutions can provide a fruitful 
platform for China to demonstrate its Goodwill Agenda. The thesis focuses on the nature 
of China’s participation in these institutions, concentrating in particular on China’s voting 
behavior in the UN General Assembly in order to evaluate the attractiveness of China’s 
political values and foreign policy preferences on a wide array of global issues. This is 
not a perfect proxy of the Goodwill Agenda, which ideally would focus on clear and 
intentional efforts to engender goodwill across the globe. However, an analysis of UNGA 
voting behavior allows us to assess the internal dynamics of international organizations 
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and the attractiveness of China’s foreign policy preferences, which should matter a great 
deal if the country wants to build a positive reputation. 
Voting behavior in the UN General Assembly is an increasingly common measure 
of state preferences (Stone 2006; Dreher and Jensen 2011; Voeten 2012), which has 
traditionally proven exceptionally difficult to operationalize. It offers a better method to 
evaluate state preferences than, for example, alliances which are often outdated, informal, 
and lasting even though they are often based on temporal strategic interests (Voeten 
2012). Moreover, the UNGA handles a wide variety of global issues, on everything from 
financing peacekeeping operations to promoting multilingualism in the classroom. 
Between its main committees, the General Assembly addresses disarmament and 
international security; economics; and social, humanitarian and cultural issues. Finally, as 
Dreher and Jensen (2011) note, “While the UNGA is generally considered a weak 
institution, it is a relatively unique environment where we can easily observe the relative 
policy positions of essentially every nation in the world in the same institutional setting” 
over a significant period of time (2). Even the U.S. Department of State recognizes the 
importance of examining UNGA voting behavior in order to better understand which 
countries have similar interests and harmonious values to its own, which countries do not, 
and which countries fall somewhere in the middle (Dreher and Jensen 2011, 2). 
Institutions have played a large role in China’s Goodwill Agenda for many years. 
Since the mid-1990s, China has emphasized multilateralism, cooperation, and leadership 
within regional and international institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, which it co-founded with Russia and three other central Asian countries in 
1996; the World Trade Organization (WTO), which it joined in 2001; and the Association 
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of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which spawned ASEAN Plus Three when China, 
Japan and South Korea joined in 1995. China has also demonstrated a willingness to 
cooperate on a number of global issues, including terrorism, nuclear disarmament, and 
the six-party talks; in each of these arenas, China has taken on a leadership role 
(Goldstein 2007). Of course, not all of these institutions indicate that China shares 
converging interests with liberal democracies. The SCO and ASEAN, for example, are 
largely comprised of authoritarian members, and thus China’s participation in these 
settings may simultaneously appeal to certain groups of countries while alienating others. 
On the other hand, China’s ascension to the WTO and cooperative leadership on issues 
like North Korea demonstrate a changed orientation towards institutions that should 
appeal to Western countries. 
China also participates in several far-reaching regional organizations. The country 
has long fashioned itself as a leader and a voice for developing countries. For many 
years, Beijing has touted “win-win” relations with developing countries, and this phrase 
has emerged repeatedly in official speeches and white papers, especially in relation to 
Chinese foreign policy towards countries in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. It 
should not be surprising, then, that the institutional strategies of China’s Goodwill 
Agenda extend to this arena; over the past ten to fifteen years, China has taken a 
particularly active role in development programs around the globe. China became a 
participating member of the African Development Bank Group in 1996. It represents one 
of five non-regional members in the Caribbean Development Bank, which it joined in 
1998; and in 2009, China became a non-regional member of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (Central Intelligence Agency). 
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But the United Nations General Assembly provides the most fruitful area for 
analysis. A study of UNGA voting behavior will provide a deeper understanding of the 
attractiveness of China’s global political preferences and values, which – as we have 
determined – form a key component of a country’s soft power. If Malawi, for instance, 
votes similarly to China in the UNGA, it means that the two countries likely share foreign 
policy preferences and China’s political values – by extension – should seem more 
attractive to Malawi. This attractiveness should contribute to a positive image of China 
and enhance the effectiveness of the Goodwill Agenda. To be clear, member states in the 
General Assembly do not address bilateral relations; they vote on global issues. If China 
and another country vote ‘no’ on the same resolution, it does not mean they agree on a 
specific policy, nor does it make them allies. Rather, it reveals a common and general 
policy preference. To illustrate, Voeten (2012) explains, think of Pakistan and India or 
Ethiopia and Eritrea – countries that have violent histories of enmity and territorial 
conflict yet carry similar UNGA voting profiles on territorial issues because many of 
their foreign policy preferences and values align on this subject.  
For the purposes of this study, China’s behavior in the UN General Assembly 
deserves attention because it demonstrates China’s willingness to work (or not work) 
with other countries in an international context; reveals China’s preferences on a wide 
array of global issues that may or may not align with other countries; and provides a 
measurable indicator of state preferences in a controlled setting. When China and other 
countries share similar voting patterns in the UNGA, China’s foreign policy preferences 
should serve as a source of attraction and we would expect the other countries to view 
China more positively, as a result. On the other hand, when China systematically 
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disagrees with other countries on UNGA votes, we would expect that China’s policy 
preferences are seen as unappealing, thus undermining China’s soft power and the 
Goodwill Agenda. The thesis is interested in studying the appeal of China’s policy 
preferences and values to an international audience, and whether China’s behavior in 
institutions strengthens the effectiveness of China’s Goodwill Agenda. China’s voting 
affinity with other countries in the UNGA should serve as a useful proxy to achieve these 
purposes.  
 
Building Goodwill through Foreign Aid 
China’s foreign aid program forms another important strain of the Goodwill 
Agenda. Like all other donors, the Chinese give aid for a combination of political, 
economic, and ideological reasons, and China is certainly not the only country to use aid 
partly to engender goodwill. The Chinese approach to aid, however, is somewhat unique. 
Decisions about where and how to invest Chinese aid are usually based more on business 
interests and experimentation in development strategy than on any other factors. China’s 
aid program, in both rhetoric and practice, is based on principles of non-interference in 
domestic affairs, which contrasts markedly with Western aid conditionality (Brautigam 
2009). Thus, China is sometimes willing to work with countries neglected by Western 
donors. China also has a tendency to sponsor big budget, high-profile infrastructure 
projects like government buildings and hospitals that carry “tangible benefits and serve as 
constant reminders of China’s beneficence” (Lum et al. 2008, 34).  
Even though aid does not represent a clear-cut example of soft power and often 
blurs into economic policy, which belongs to the realm of hard power, aid remains an 
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important element of the Goodwill Agenda. More often than not, foreign aid constitutes a 
soft power strategy because it does not exert significant resources or coercion to engender 
goodwill. Aid is used by many countries for a combination of political, economic and 
altruistic reasons, and China is no different. I include foreign aid in my analysis of the 
Goodwill Agenda to provide a more comprehensive picture of the diverse strains of this 
agenda.   
We can expect aid to play an especially prominent role among developing 
countries. Because developed countries are not aid recipients, they are likely to remain 
unaffected by the aid strategies of China’s Goodwill Agenda. The thesis examines the 
influence of Chinese aid projects completed between 2000 and 2005 and food aid 
distributed between 2000 and 2010. In regions like Africa, which receives significant 
amounts of Chinese aid, we should expect to see more favorable opinions of China if the 
Goodwill Agenda proves effective.  
Though China’s foreign aid program has garnered recent international attention, 
its aid program dates back to the 1950s (State Council). However, because China has 
long operated its aid program in secrecy, the study of foreign aid can prove exceptionally 
difficult. The Chinese aid system is not centralized. Multiple agencies are involved in the 
distribution of Chinese foreign assistance. The State Council is responsible for 
overarching policy, and the Ministry of Commerce handles the majority of Chinese aid; 
but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Export-Import Bank of China, and the China 
Development Bank are also involved in the aid process (Dreher and Fuchs 2011).  
To complicate matters, Chinese aid differs in some ways from official 
development assistance (ODA) defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
26 
 
and Development (OECD), which is the standard measure of foreign aid for most 
countries. Rather, much of China’s aid program resembles foreign investment (Brautigam 
2009; Lum et al. 2009). Because of the difficulty in determining what constitutes Chinese 
aid, there is wide variation in its estimates, and the numbers depend, in large part, on 
what type of assistance an observer includes in his or her estimates (Lum et al. 2009). 
China’s aid program is much smaller than its Western counterparts (though it is 
expanding); exaggerated numbers often mistakenly include economic activities (such as 
non-concessional loans) that do not actually constitute aid (Brautigam 2009). Lastly, 
China does not publically release aid data and statistics. On occasion, China releases 
overall aid figures, but these numbers are not fully explained nor can they be 
independently corroborated. Much of the scholarly literature relies on estimates and 
combinations of piecemeal data from multiple sources to sketch a broad picture of 
China’s aid program. All of these factors make the study of Chinese aid extraordinarily 
cumbersome.  
In response to complaints about its lack of transparency, the Chinese government 
published a white paper on foreign aid in 2011 (State Council) that provided a glimpse of 
China’s overall aid program. First, China’s aid program is growing – significantly. From 
2004 to 2009, China’s overall aid program increased by about 30 percent. Over the years 
and by the end of 2009, China had provided aid to 161 countries, 123 of which regularly 
receive aid from China. This distribution is balanced geographically between Asia, Africa 
and Latin America. In monetary figures, it corresponds to 256.29 billion yuan 
(approximately $38.5 billion USD). Grants make up roughly 40 percent of this total, 
interest-free loans constitute 30 percent, and concessional loans make up the final 30 
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percent (Dreher and Fuchs 2011; State Council). “Still,” as Dreher and Fuchs note, “it is 
not clear which financial flows are included in these calculations” (4). Thus, aid may be 
considerably greater than these estimates. 
Nevertheless, what is clear is that Beijing has targeted foreign aid as an important 
element of China’s Goodwill Agenda. In 2000, China ushered in a new era in foreign 
assistance with the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 
and it declared a “new strategic partnership” with the continent in 2006 when it pledged 
to double its aid to Africa by 2009 (Dreher and Fuchs 2011). Wang Yizhou, a scholar at 
Beijing University, recently remarked in anticipation of the fifth FOCAC summit:  
"African countries are impressed most by China's strength as an emerging 
economic power. At the same time, China’s international assistance teams 
have created many miracles in Africa, demonstrating wisdom and hard 
work of the Chinese people and establishing a good reputation… China 
needs to enhance an image of comprehensive social development instead 
of leaving an impression of ‘a limp giant.’ We have to explore soft 
assistance in cultural, social, military and other areas” (Yang 2012). 
To measure the effectiveness of aid strategies in China’s Goodwill Agenda, the 
thesis will focus on two indicators of aid: the total number of Chinese aid projects 
completed between 2000 and 2005 and cumulative food aid distributed by China between 
2000 and 2010. First, a dataset compiled by Hawkins et al. (2010) from the Chinese 
Commerce Yearbook provides the number of Chinese aid projects completed between 
1990 and 2005, though my analysis focuses on the period between 2000 and 2005. Aid 
projects form a major component of China’s aid program; they are usually “productive or 
civil” infrastructure projects sponsored by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in the 
form of grants and interest-free loans (State Council 2011). Second, the World Food 
Programme’s Food Aid Information System maintains a site that records annual food aid 
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distributions by donor countries, including China, beginning in 1988. My research 
examines cumulative amounts of food aid distributed between 2000 and 2010 (World 
Food Programme). China has targeted food aid as an increasingly important element of 
its aid program in light of the UN Millennium Development Goals and global food 
security concerns (State Council).  
These measures carry a number of advantages. First, we know that these projects 
and distributions were actually completed and distributed, unlike many aid data which 
come from project budgets and policy plans. Moreover, since they are recorded in the 
year that either the project was completed or the year that the food aid was distributed, 
there is less of a time lag than aid figures which come from the early stages of the aid 
cycle. Second, these measures are countable and verifiable over an extended time period. 
This is important because Chinese aid data have a tendency to vary wildly year-to-year 
(Dreher and Fuchs 2011). Third, and most importantly, these measures definitely 
constitute aid -- under the traditional ODA definition -- unlike many Chinese foreign 
assistance programs which blur the line between foreign investment and aid.  
Though measurements of China’s foreign assistance program present tremendous 
challenges to scholars, China’s aid projects from 2000 to 2005 and food aid allocations 
from 2000 to 2010 should provide useful indicators of aid strategies in the Goodwill 
Agenda. If effective, we should expect to see more favorable opinions of China in 
countries that have received recent Chinese aid, though the effects of these types of aid 
may differ. Because Chinese aid projects are usually infrastructure-related and are often 
accompanied by unveiling ceremonies, they attract more attention and notice (Lum et al. 
2008). In addition, state of the art sports facilities (like the construction of three 
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natatoriums in Morocco) and extensive highway bridges (like the transportation project in 
Bangladesh) are more permanent as well as eye-catching. For this reason, I expect 
Chinese aid projects to have a more significant and lasting impact than food aid on public 
opinions of China. The use of two aid indicators provides a more nuanced evaluation of 
the effects of China’s Goodwill Agenda in developing countries.  
 
Expectations of the Goodwill Agenda 
Overall, China’s Goodwill Agenda resembles American foreign policy programs 
like the Peace Corps, Fulbright Program, and USAID, which are similarly designed to 
build goodwill among international audiences and help the United States achieve its 
foreign policy objectives. The thesis focuses attention on China’s cultural, institutional 
and aid-related strategies, using indicators to evaluate the Goodwill Agenda along 
multiple dimensions. Some of these strategies apply to a broad audience. For instance, 
UNGA voting, which provides insight into the attractiveness of China’s foreign policy 
preferences, has the potential to appeal to a wide swath of countries. China holds a 
unique position within the UN, straddling the line between developed and developing 
country. It is a permanent member of the Security Council and has a powerful voice 
representing the world’s second largest economy, yet it belongs to the Group of 77 voting 
bloc of developing nations. China’s unique position is significant because “the North-
South divide explains a huge share of variation in voting behavior” within the General 
Assembly (Dreher and Jensen 2011, 11). Chinese policy preferences, therefore, may be 
uniquely positioned to appeal to diverse groups of countries. Or, from a more cynical 
perspective, China may hold the unfortunate position of policy preferences that appeal to 
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no one. Regardless, when China resembles another country’s voting patterns, the two 
countries’ foreign policy preferences and political values are more likely to align. This 
should tell us about the level attraction Chinese foreign policy holds to a global audience, 
which is a major component of soft power and the Goodwill Agenda. 
The other two indicators of the Goodwill Agenda examined here seem more 
clearly skewed toward specific audiences. China’s foreign aid program is obviously 
targeted to engender goodwill among developing countries, roughly balanced between 
Central Asia, Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. I expect aid projects to have a 
larger and more lasting impact than food aid simply because infrastructure projects are 
more permanent, but also because they garner attention and are often accompanied by 
symbolic ceremonies and news headlines. I expect countries that have benefited from 
Chinese aid projects to have more favorable opinions of China than countries that have 
just received food aid or that have received no Chinese aid at all.  
The Confucius Institute project, whether by design or happenstance, is biased – at 
least in number – towards Western countries. Moreover, the United States has at least 
four times as many Confucius Institutes as any other country. Cultural strategies within 
the Goodwill Agenda are no more likely to influence the West than any other region of 
the world, but in terms of sheer resources, the Chinese have spent inordinate amounts of 
money on the Institute project in North America and Europe. Any evaluation of the 
Goodwill Agenda must take these biases into account, but in general we should expect 
China’s image to improve over time after an institute opens in a given country. If the 
project is effective at improving China’s image, there is likely a threshold on the number 
of Confucius Institutes at which effectiveness peaks. It is unlikely that the resources spent 
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building 72 Confucius Institutes in the United States translates to that much more 
improvement in China’s favorability ratings compared to other countries.  
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CHAPTER IV 
PUBLIC OPINION 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies, I divide my analysis into 
three strains of foreign policy (culture, institutions and aid) using the four indicators 
mentioned previously. My goal here is to observe general patterns of China’s Goodwill 
Agenda and determine whether these strategies positively affected China’s image in 
countries around the globe during the twenty-first century. I use polling data from the 
Pew Global Attitudes Project, which conducts annual surveys on opinions of China, to 
evaluate the effects of these efforts. This is in line with other scholars (Nye 2004; 
d’Hooghe 2011) who use opinion polls to measure the influence of soft power strategies. 
The Goodwill Agenda is designed to build a positive China brand, and we should expect 
that countries improve their overall opinion of China when they open a Confucius 
Institute, share foreign policy preferences with China in the UN General Assembly, and 
receive Chinese project or food aid. 
Of course, the influence of these strategies is diffuse and it is impossible to isolate 
the effects of the Goodwill Agenda from political and other contextual factors that likely 
play a large role in whether China’s intended message is received. Nye (2004) illustrates 
this point. “Soft power is more difficult to wield,” he writes, “because… many of its 
crucial resources are outside the control of governments, and their effects depend heavily 
on acceptance by the receiving audiences. Moreover, soft-power resources often work 
indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes take years to produce 
desired outcomes” (99). Still, public opinion polls are probably the best measure of 
China’s Goodwill Agenda because they can measure the effects of multiple strategies 
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across diverse groups of people (d’Hooghe 2011). As long as we exercise caution when 
interpreting results, opinion polls can provide a rough sketch of China’s image abroad 
over time.  
 The publically available Pew Global Attitudes Project functions as a particularly 
useful survey because of its consistency over time and its geographical scope. The 
question – “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat 
unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of China” – has been asked since 2002 and 
every year since 2005. Over the years, the project has canvassed more than fifty nations 
on this question, although the surveyed countries can vary somewhat year to year (Pew 
Global 2012). The thesis will focus on responses of 51 countries between 2002 and 2012. 
(It excludes responses from China, which are not relevant to the study since the thesis 
aims to evaluate opinions outside of the country; it also excludes Palestine, which does 
not exercise voting rights in the UNGA.) Since most countries were polled at least once, 
this produces 168 unique data points for our dependent variable: the percentage of 
favorable opinions of China in a given country in a given year. Respondents who viewed 
China very favorably and somewhat favorably are pooled into a single category for this 
analysis. 
 The data for my independent variables are gleaned from a number of secondary 
sources. Information for the Confucius Institute project comes from the project’s official 
website, which lists the location and history of every Confucius Institute currently in 
operation. Some of the historical information on the site, however, is more thorough than 
others and there are discrepancies between some of the dates. A portion of the institutes 
list the date when the agreement between two partnering institutions was signed; others 
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list the date that the institute first opened to the public. Sometimes these dates fall within 
the same year, but that is not always the case. Whenever possible, I use the opening date 
of the institute, although this information is not always available. This problem should be 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that Confucius Institutes, in my measurement, 
accumulate over time. Within my sample, the first institute opened in 2005 and the last 
opened in 2010. Polling data up to 2012 should capture the effects of even the latest 
Confucius Institute, and we should expect to see more improvement in opinions of China 
as Confucius Institutes open over time.  
 To measure the attractiveness of China’s foreign policy preferences, I test the 
similarity of China’s voting behavior with other states in the UN General Assembly. The 
Strezhnev and Voeten dataset on UNGA voting covers 1946 to 2011 and calculates 
annual S-scores that represent voting affinity between dyads on a linear scale from -1 
(least similar interests) to +1 (most similar interests). My analysis focuses on the period 
between 2002 and 2011 to coincide with the Pew polling data. This dataset is particularly 
useful because it distinguishes between abstentions and ‘no’ votes, unlike earlier UNGA 
voting datasets which classified them in the same way and probably distorted analysis 
(Voeten 2012). In short, countries that share similar UNGA voting preferences with 
China (represented by S-scores close to +1) should find Chinese foreign policy 
preferences more attractive and hold higher opinions of China than countries with 
dissimilar voting patterns (represented by S-scores close to -1). 
The thesis employs two indicators to measure China’s foreign aid program. First, 
Hawkins et al. (2010) compile an extensive list of completed aid projects between 1990 
and 2005 gleaned from the China Commerce Yearbook and the Almanac of China’s 
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Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, which are published annually by the Ministry of 
Commerce. Data is available for every year except 2002, and the thesis concentrates on 
the total number of completed aid projects between 2000 and 2005. In addition, the 
dataset offers brief descriptions of every project, although financial and budgetary 
information are scarce. We should expect countries such as Tanzania, Jordan, and 
Pakistan that benefited from multiple aid projects to hold higher opinions of China than 
countries that did not receive this type of foreign assistance. 
Second, the World Food Programme maintains the public and web-based Food 
Aid Information System, which tracks annual food aid distributions by China and other 
donors. Food aid is measured in tons of grain equivalents and classified as project, 
programme or emergency aid. The thesis cumulates the total amount of food aid 
distributed by China since 2000. Only a few countries within the survey have received 
Chinese food aid, although this should not be entirely surprising. Countries that require 
emergency assistance and food aid are often in conflict-ridden areas that pollsters have 
difficulty reaching; therefore, many of them are not represented in this sample. In 
general, there may be a bias in the Pew survey against countries which need donor 
assistance the most. This is yet another reason I employ two measures to evaluate the 
impact of China’s foreign aid program. In brief, we should expect countries that have 
received Chinese food aid (such as Ethiopia, Mali and Bangladesh) to exhibit higher 
opinions of China than countries that have not received this type of aid. 
For my control variables, I also incorporate five other indicators that may account 
for variation in China’s favorability rating. The World Bank Group provides annual data 
on GDP per capita measured in USD. I also account for population size and a country’s 
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distance from China, by measuring (in miles) the capital city’s distance from Beijing 
(Central Intelligence Agency). As the literature on great power politics explains, 
wealthier countries with larger populations may be wary of a rising China that can 
challenge their position in the international arena. Moreover, China’s neighbors may 
prove distrustful of the country even as it invests enormous resources in the Goodwill 
Agenda. These three variables work to mitigate the effects of patterns in wealth, 
population and distance in my analysis. 
Lastly, I employ two political indicators to help control for any bias in liberal or 
democratic regimes against illiberal and autocratic China. Since most of the polled 
countries in the Pew survey are democracies, I use the Polity IV score as a proxy for 
regime type. For each year, the Polity IV Project (Marshall) ranks countries on a 
democratic scale from -10 to +10, where +10 represents consolidated democracy and -10 
represents hereditary monarchy. To account for liberalism, I code Freedom House scores 
on a three-point scale, where +1 means the country is free, 0 signifies that it is partly free, 
and -1 means that it is not free. Unlike the Polity scores, which focus primarily on 
institutional design, the Freedom House score gives insight into the level of civil liberties 
a country enjoys, including freedom of speech and the rule of law. These are two areas 
that China has gained particular notoriety and probably contribute to its negative 
reputation, especially in Western liberal societies. Together, these political variables help 
isolate the effects of regime type and liberalism. Table 1 provides summary statistics, 
with information on the number of cases, means, minimums, maximums and standard 
deviations for each variable employed in my analysis. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Favorable Opinion of China 168 14 92 52.49 15.963 
Confucius Institutes 168 0 71 6.21 11.810 
UNGA S-Score 149 -.6974 .9538 .554032 .3906725 
Total Aid Projects 2000 - 
2005 
168 0 7 .64 1.216 
Cumulative Food Aid since 
2000 
148 .0000 5,052.4000 87.485811 487.8963777 
GDP per capita 168 252 50558 17,671.80 16770.353 
Distance from China 168 592.4100 11985.3800 4,978.222500 2330.0029343 
Polity IV Index 164 -7 10 6.74 4.416 
Freedom House 168 -1 1 .43 .747 
Population 168 2,646,314 1,205,073,612 103,033,129.12 145,667,346.68 
Year 168 2002 2012 2008.38 2.364 
Valid N (listwise) 145     
 
To summarize my expectations, I anticipate that the four independent variables 
representing China’s Goodwill Agenda (Confucius Institutes, UNGA S-Score, Total Aid 
Projects, and Cumulative Food Aid) will produce positive coefficients. Of these, I expect 
that Confucius Institutes and Chinese project aid will probably produce the largest and 
most significant coefficients because their presence is more newsworthy and long-term 
than food aid or the ongoing dynamics in the UN General Assembly. Within the control 
variables, I anticipate that GDP per capita, Population, Polity IV Index, and Freedom 
House will have negative coefficients while Distance from China will have a positive 
coefficient (although I do not expect any of these variables to be statistically significant). 
Lastly, Year should produce a positive and potentially statistically significant coefficient 
as the Goodwill Agenda deploys soft power strategies over time. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
My results indicate that China’s cultural and aid-related strategies have improved 
China’s reputation during the twenty-first century, but that the institutional strategies of 
the Goodwill Agenda may actually undermine China’s soft power resources. Contrary to 
expectations and despite extensive efforts from Beijing, the Goodwill Agenda has not 
succeeded in improving China’s image abroad. In fact, between 2002 and 2012, average 
favorable opinions of China actually decreased slightly. Figure 1 displays the combined 
global averages of favorable opinions of China between 2002 (64.6 percent) and 2012 
(47.3 percent).  
Figure 1 
Average Favorable Opinion of China (as a percentage), 2002 – 2012. 
 
Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project. 2012. 
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China’s reputation experienced modest gains between 2008 (47.4 percent) and 
2011 (53.5 percent), which is perhaps a function of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, a high-
profile and highly successful event that showcased China among international audiences 
around the globe. However, these improvements did not manage to compensate for an 
overall deteriorating trend over the course of the decade. A linear regression model, 
detailed in Table 2, provides deeper analysis into these dynamics. First, the coefficient for 
year tells us that time has negatively influenced China’s reputation between 2002 and 
2012, despite the efforts of the Goodwill Agenda. The variable is also statistically 
significant at the ten percent level. This finding contradicts my expectations which 
supposed that opinions of China would improve over time as the soft power strategies of 
China’s Goodwill Agenda were deployed.  
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Table 2  
Linear Regression Model
2
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 1931.806 1109.395  1.741 .084 
Confucius Institutes .089 .146 .065 .612 .542 
UNGA S-Score -1.960 5.210 -.050 -.376 .707 
Total Aid Projects 2000 - 
2005 
1.079 1.161 .087 .929 .354 
Cumulative Food Aid 
since 2000 
.012 .004 .211 2.743 .007 
GDP per capita .000 .000 -.450 -3.523 .001 
Distance from China .000 .000 -.038 -.497 .620 
Polity IV Index .720 .477 .203 1.510 .133 
Freedom House -4.928 2.767 -.232 -1.781 .077 
Population -2.318E-009 .000 -.019 -.225 .822 
Year -.933 .553 -.127 -1.688 .094 
 
 
To assess the Goodwill Agenda along the three strains of foreign policy discussed 
here, we can observe the coefficients for the four indicators representing China’s cultural, 
institutional and aid-related strategies. First, most of the coefficients representing China’s 
Goodwill Agenda – including Confucius Institutes, Total Aid Projects 2000 – 2005, and 
Cumulative Food Aid since 2000 – are positive. This matches my expectations. 
Confucius Institutes and China’s foreign aid program have a generally positive influence 
on China’s reputation abroad. Aid projects may have a sizeable impact on opinion. For 
every completed aid project, favorable opinions of China increase by about one 
                                                 
2
 When I use only the Polity IV Index as a political indicator, year loses its statistical significance (p = 
.104). Using just the Freedom House indicator, cumulative food aid falls outside of statistical significance 
(p = .149) and Freedom House also moves outside of this threshold (p = .285). All other coefficients 
maintain their signs and statistical significance. 
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percentage point, although this variable is not statistically significant. Confucius 
Institutes and cumulative food aid also positively influence opinions towards China, but 
this last variable is highly significant – at the one percent level.  
These findings loosely coincide with my initial hypotheses. I expected the 
Confucius Institute project and China’s foreign aid program to have generally positive 
effects on China’s reputation abroad. However, most of these variables are not 
statistically significant, and the results should be interpreted with caution. At the same 
time, some of my other expectations were wrong. Within the category of aid, I assumed 
that project aid would influence opinions of China more than food aid since Chinese 
project aid – usually in the form of infrastructure projects -- tends to be more newsworthy 
and long-lasting than food aid. Yet food aid is the only strain of the Goodwill Agenda 
that we can confidently conclude has an impact on global opinions of China. While this 
effect may appear small, keep in mind that food aid is measured in tons of grain 
equivalents and China donates food in large quantities. For instance, if China donated 
500 tons of food to a country (as it did for Bangladesh in 2004), we should expect 
opinions of China to improve by six percentage points, which is a very significant 
increase. Indeed, 74 percent of Bangladeshis viewed China favorably in 2007. Pakistan 
was also a beneficiary of Chinese food aid and showed more favorable opinions over the 
duration of the Pew survey (from 79 percent in 2005 to 85 percent in 2012). Viewed in 
this light, food aid may be China’s most effective strategy for improving its reputation in 
other countries. 
One of the more surprising elements of the analysis reveals that China’s voting 
affinity with other nations in the UN General Assembly negatively influences opinions of 
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China. The coefficient for UNGA S-scores is negative, which contradicts my 
expectations. Remember, countries with similar voting preferences in the UNGA are 
represented by S-scores near +1, whereas countries that hold opposing interests are 
represented by S-scores closer to -1. Since the coefficient for UNGA S-scores is negative, 
this means that countries that share policy preferences with China in the UN General 
Assembly are less likely to hold favorable opinions of China than countries that exhibit 
opposing voting interests. For instance, Egypt which shares remarkable voting affinity 
with China (and has an average S-score of 0.942) averages only a 57 percent favorability 
rating between 2006 and 2012. Conversely, favorable opinions in Israel are only slightly 
lower, averaging 50 percent, even though the country consistently exhibits opposing 
interests in the UNGA with an average S-score of -0.476. The coefficient of the UNGA 
variable is surprising, although it is not significant. At the very least, we can say that 
countries that share policy preferences with China in the UN General Assembly are just 
as likely (or perhaps even more likely) to hold unfavorable opinions of China than 
countries that share opposing voting interests. 
For my control variables, GDP per capita and a country’s distance from China 
have no effect on opinions of China. Wealth and geography play little role in determining 
whether another country thinks highly or poorly of Beijing. Population effects are equally 
small though its variable is not significant at all. These findings are somewhat surprising 
since I assumed that larger and wealthier countries, especially those in China’s 
neighborhood, would be more wary of its rising status as a global or regional challenger, 
but the thesis finds that opinions of China are influenced by other factors.  
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My political indicators merit more discussion. The Polity coefficient is positive 
(+0.720), meaning that democratic countries hold higher opinions of China than their 
nondemocratic counterparts. This is surprising given that many scholars question China’s 
soft power resources based on its one-party, autocratic regime. Of course, the Polity score 
does not carry statistical significance, but the sign of its coefficient is puzzling, to say the 
least. On the other hand, the Freedom House indicator, which I coded on a three-point 
scale, may give credence to these arguments. Countries that are classified as “free” by 
Freedom House (coded +1 in my analysis) have less favorable opinions of China – by a 
large and statistically significant margin (-4.928*). We can say with some degree of 
confidence that liberal countries have an average opinion of China that is five percentage 
points lower than their illiberal counterparts. Therefore, the findings of the thesis supports 
scholars like Nye (2004) and d’Hooghe (2011) who argue that Beijing’s domestic 
repression undermines China’s soft power resources.  
To test the durability of these results, I also run a first-difference model 
summarized in Table 3. This model neither confirms nor discredits the majority of the 
earlier findings; the results are decidedly mixed. However, there are some notable 
differences. Signs change for two of the coefficients, including Confucius Institutes and 
UNGA S-score, although neither carries statistical significance. Unfortunately, these two 
indicators represent strains of the Goodwill Agenda. In the first-difference model, UNGA 
voting affinity positively influences opinions of China while Confucius Institutes may 
actually undermine China’s reputation abroad. This contradicts the findings of the linear 
regression model, although in neither model are these variables statistically significant.  
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Table 3 
First-Difference Model 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
 
(Constant) 3.565 1.595  2.236 .028 
DIFF(Year) -2.348 1.214 -.189 -1.934 .056 
DIFF(Confucius Institutes) -.211 .232 -.087 -.907 .367 
DIFF(UNGA S-Score) 7.402 12.823 .054 .577 .565 
DIFF(Cumulative Food 
Aid since 2000) 
.017 .123 -.132 -1.436 .094 
DIFF(GDP per capita) -.001 .000 -.303 -3.074 .003 
DIFF(Polity IV Index) 1.105 .923 .111 1.198 .234 
Note: Total Aid Projects 2000 - 2005, Distance from China, Freedom House, and 
Population are time-invariant indicators. They function as constants in the first-
difference model and are thus excluded from the output. 
 
On the other hand, the first-difference model confirms several key findings of the 
linear regression model. The coefficient for year remains negative and cumulative food 
aid stays positive; moreover, both of these variables maintain their statistical significance. 
Despite my initial hypothesis, it is clear that time has not helped China build a positive 
brand over the course of the past decade. In addition, this second model confirms that 
food aid represents China’s most effective strategy for engendering international 
goodwill. In both models, cumulative food aid is the only consistently positive and 
statistically significant variable of the Goodwill Agenda. Lastly, we are unable to test 
four of the variables from the linear regression analysis, including Total Project Aid 2000 
– 2005, because they are time-invariant indicators. They are excluded as individual 
variables from the first-difference output, although their effects are captured in the 
constant.  
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CHAPTER VI 
LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA 
Of course, we must interpret these results with a healthy degree of caution, 
especially since the two models differ in several key areas. Opinion polls are not perfect 
tools for evaluating China’s Goodwill Agenda or any other soft power strategy. The Pew 
survey does not ask respondents to explain their opinions, and these findings “do not tell 
us much about why people have negative feelings about China and why they have 
changed their minds over time” (d’Hooghe 2011, 15). Moreover, the thesis only 
examines four indicators of the Goodwill Agenda, though this is an amorphous foreign 
policy orientation that seeps into many areas of China’s international relations. The 
Confucius Institute project, for instance, can hardly offer a full picture of the cultural 
strategies associated with the Goodwill Agenda.  
Most importantly, there may be serious limitations to the data and indicators used 
in this analysis. The contradictory findings between the linear regression and first-
difference models may reflect problems with the indicators used to evaluate the 
Confucius Institute project and UNGA voting affinity. First, the Confucius Institutes 
probably require a longer time lag before they have any influence on opinions of China. 
In some cases, I am forced to use the date of the signed agreement between a Chinese and 
foreign institution even though it can take many additional months before a Confucius 
Institute actually opens its doors to the public. But even the institutes that provide 
information about their public opening may suffer from this problem. Because the overall 
project is very new, there remains wide variation among the hundreds of Confucius 
Institutes in operation. It can take years before a Confucius Institute develops its own 
46 
 
identity, purpose and presence. The first-difference model, in particular, probably 
underestimates the impact of the Confucius Institute project because it does not provide 
an adequate time lag. This may explain why Confucius Institutes have a negative 
coefficient in the first-difference model.  
Second, my proxy for assessing the attractiveness of foreign policy may prove 
problematic in the case of China. The UN General Assembly is frequently used as a 
platform to compare state preferences. However, within the Pew survey, there are only 
two countries that consistently exhibit negative S-scores with China: the United States 
and Israel. (Canada also had a negative S-score with China, but in one year only.) Across 
the survey, 48 of 51 countries shared positive S-scores with China in every year that they 
were polled, which signals surprising consistency in voting affinity with China. Thus, 
there may not be enough variation in the data to adequately assess China’s behavior in 
international institutions. Scholars seeking to understand the attractiveness of Chinese 
foreign policy as a soft power resource probably need to examine different countries or 
they need to employ another measure of this indicator. 
Third, China’s foreign aid program is uncommonly difficult to evaluate. Unlike 
all of the other Goodwill Agenda indicators used in the thesis, the information for project 
aid is not available for recent years, and I am forced to rely on a static measure. Because 
of this, I am unable to corroborate the findings for project aid in the first-difference 
model. Undoubtedly, this impacts my findings. If and when Beijing decides to release 
more information on its aid program, scholars will gain a much clearer picture of the 
breadth and impact of China’s aid strategies within the Goodwill Agenda. 
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From a broad perspective and across all indicators, the thesis is limited by time 
constraints. Most scholars agree that the effects of soft power strategies can take many 
years to manifest, and the Pew survey, while offering a decade-long glimpse, may require 
more time to observe the Goodwill Agenda’s actual effects. The Goodwill Agenda is still 
relatively young, and time may offer a different picture of its impact on Chinese foreign 
relations. Nevertheless, the thesis does shed some light on the general trends of China’s 
reputation across the decade and among a wide global audience.  
  
48 
 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
For supporters of China’s Goodwill Agenda, the results of this thesis should be 
sobering. Despite the hundreds of Confucius Institutes that have opened since 2004, 
despite increasing cooperation in international institutions, and despite significant 
amounts of aid that have flowed into developing countries, perceptions about China 
remain stubbornly entrenched. If anything, China’s reputation has suffered over the past 
ten years, disappointing hopes that the Goodwill Agenda could help to build a positive 
China brand. The analysis illustrates that there are elements of the Goodwill Agenda that 
seem to be effective. China has successfully utilized its food aid program to engender 
goodwill in several developing countries, and it may want to expand the program beyond 
its typical handful of African countries if it wants to harness this strategy more effectively 
in the future. The thesis also finds that the Confucius Institute project and Chinese aid 
projects – while probably positive influences on China’s reputation – produce no tangible 
results. Worse still, China’s foreign policy preferences, even when they align with other 
countries, do nothing to improve global opinions. Certainly, time may yield more 
productive results, and there is reason to believe that the Confucius Institute project, in 
particular, will have a longer-term impact than the analysis reveals here.  
Of course, the findings do not indicate that the Goodwill Agenda has been wholly 
unsuccessful. Without Chinese efforts across these cultural, institutional and aid 
dimensions, global opinions may have deteriorated even more significantly between 2002 
and 2012. There are certainly other dynamics that color China’s relations with the rest of 
the world, and the thesis does not discuss China’s military or economic relations with 
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other countries, nor does it account for current events or other news stories that may 
influence people’s opinion of China. The impact of China’s military modernization, 
ownership of increasing American debt, tainted milk scares, etc. compete with the 
Goodwill Agenda to inform people’s perceptions of China. Indeed, given these examples, 
it seems very likely that global opinions of China would be much worse without the 
efforts of the Goodwill Agenda. Moreover, reputation can take years to build and seconds 
to destroy, as the events in Tiananmen Square eloquently illustrated. China has devoted 
significant time, resources, and official attention to the Goodwill Agenda and it remains 
to be seen whether this is money well spent. The Goodwill Agenda must be viewed 
through a long-term lens, and it must also be viewed in the broad context of China’s 
overall international relations. Therefore, definitive assessments of the success or failure 
of this foreign policy orientation go beyond the scope of my analysis.  
The only conclusively successful strategy is China’s food aid program, which 
impacts a small number of developing countries. Part of China’s problem may be 
communicating the goodwill message to broad audiences. While China’s cooperative 
behavior in institutions like the United Nations may appeal to political leaders, it is 
unlikely to sway the personal opinions of average citizens. And if China seeks to build a 
wide-reaching and positive reputation, it will need to focus its attention on strategies that 
influence elites as well as publics. This may explain why food aid produces such 
effective results: it garners goodwill from leaders that desperately need assistance, but it 
also directly impacts the general populace. Therefore, it may be prudent for the Chinese 
to focus more on programs and policies that impact and appeal to broad audiences. This 
might include maintaining long-term support for the Confucius Institute project, but it 
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also might include expanding China’s international media presence and increasing 
foreign direct investment in regions around the globe. However, despite China’s best 
intentions, even strategies targeted at broad audiences may not impart the country’s 
intended message of peace and positive relations. Many of the agenda’s programs and 
policies, while seemingly benign, have generated heated controversy in foreign countries. 
For example, Chinese aid to Africa and many Confucius Institute openings in the United 
States have met resistance, protests, and negative media attention.  
My findings cast some doubt on the effectiveness of soft power strategies in 
combating negative and threat-oriented opinions about China. For instance, the political 
variables in this analysis indicate that China’s illiberal tendencies undermine the 
Goodwill Agenda. As Nye (2012) recently observed, “Great powers try to use culture and 
narrative to create soft power that promotes their national interests, but it's not an easy 
sell when the message is inconsistent with their domestic realities.” Some degree of 
political reform may be the best way that China can build a positive international brand. 
When China imprisons human rights activists, suppresses Tibetans and censors its 
internet, it is also sending an international message – one that contradicts the efforts and 
promises of the Goodwill Agenda. Reputation matters in international politics but the 
Goodwill Agenda can only succeed if China’s message to international audiences 
remains consistent.  
There may be limits to soft power strategies, and if China wants to learn from its 
successes and failures, then the Goodwill Agenda will need to adapt in order to maximize 
its effectiveness. China may need to turn away from institutional strategies that probably 
only apply to political elites and have shown, at best, mixed results in improving China’s 
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global reputation. Instead, I argue that China should be patient with the cultural strategies 
of the Goodwill Agenda such as the Confucius Institute project that will likely take years 
to fully develop. Beijing should also devote more resources and expand China’s foreign 
aid program, which has been the Goodwill Agenda’s most successful strategy to date. It 
does not matter whether a country is rich or poor, large or small, near or far; China’s 
Goodwill Agenda needs to target the broadest possible audience if it wishes to improve 
its reputation globally, and it should focus on elements of foreign policy that appeal to 
political leaders as well as the general populace. While the results of the thesis question 
the effectiveness of the Goodwill Agenda, it likely that China’s reputation would have 
deteriorated even more between 2002 and 2012 without China’s significant efforts in this 
arena. All three strains of the Goodwill Agenda, including China’s cultural, institutional, 
and aid strategies, require further study, especially research that allows for more time to 
pass in order to account for effects that may not yet be observable.  
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